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VELA YA T-E FAQIH IN THE CONSTITUTION OF IRAN:
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEOCRACY
Neil Shevlin*
The May 1997 election of Mohammed Khatami, a relative moder-
ate among Iran's ruling clergy, to the Presidency of Iran raised the
question of whether the United States should continue its current
containment policy towards Iran, or take advantage of the opportu-
nity presented by Khatami's election to reestablish its ties with Iran.'
Khatami's victory was seen as indicative of growing Iranian dissatisfac-
tion with the conservative Islamic regime established by Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979.2 That regime was based upon
Khomeini's teachings as embodied in his work, Velayat-e Faqih5 a work
that was incorporated into the Iranian Constitutions of 19794 and
1989.'
The objective of this paper is to provide the reader with an under-
standing of the theocratic underpinnings of the Iranian Constitution.
Also addressed will be recent events in Iran that appear to indicate
growing discontent with the current system of government, raising
the possibility that the concepts contained in Khomeini's Velayat-e
Faqih cannot survive his death.
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, University of Pennsylvania.
See Steven Erlanger, Iran Vote May BringPressure for a Change in U.S. Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 1997, at A4 (discussing the election's potential impact on U.S. foreign policy).
See Stephen Kinzer, Many Iranians Hope Mandate Brings Change, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1997,
at Al (reporting Iranian citizens' reactions to Khatami's landslide victory) [hereinafter Kinzer,
Many Iranians Hope Mandate Brings Change].
See SHAUL BAKHASH, THE REIGN OF THE AYATOLLAHS: IRAN AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
38 (1984) ("[ Velayat-e Faqih] is a blueprint for the reorganization of society. It is a handbook for
revolution."). But see HOMA OMID, ISLAM AND THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY STATE OF IRAN 40
(1994) ("Although Khomeini had described it as a blueprint for an Islamic government, Velayat-
eFaqih (Rule by a Wise Religious Male Leader) in 1971, in fact it was little more than a criticism
of the status quo and promises of a better form of government under the guidance of the
clerky").
See Said Saffari, The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the Iranian Constitution of 1979,
20 No. 1 BRIT.J. OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. 64, 67 (1993) (describing the institutionalization of
Khomeini's teachings, Velayat-eFaqih, as the law of Iran in the 1979 Constitution).5 The 1989 Constitution that revised the 1979 Constitution is based on Velayat-e Faqih, but
contains many tenets that critics have seen as inconsistent with the concepts in Velayat-e Faqih.
See OMID, supra note 3, at 148-51.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: 1906
, A. Islam and the State
Shia Islam, the official religion of Iran, envisions a government
where religion is preeminent and God serves as the only legitimate
source for the legislation of laws. Temporal rulers merely implement
the laws of Islam as dictated by God.7
Shi'ites recognize as legitimate rulers only the twelve Imams be-
ginning with Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law and the fourth caliph of
the Muslim world, and ending with the twelfth Inam, Mohamad al-
Mahdi, who is believed to have gone into a state of hiding in 874 C.E.8
These leaders were recognized as legitimate because they were con-
sidered "divinely inspired and, like Mohamad... [were] masaum,
protected against sin."9
After the disappearance of the twelfth hnam, the Shi'ites were
forced to reach an accommodation with the secular rulers under
whose authority they lived." Although they did not accept the legiti-
macy of these various rulers, the Shi'ites opted against open rebellion
so long as these rulers actively protected Islamic law, and so long as
justice played an "integral part of the exercise of power."" It was in
large part because the regime in Iran was seen as acting unjustly that
many Iranians rose up in the early years of the twentieth century,
demanding a constitution and political reforms.
2
B. The Constitution of 1906
Until the twentieth century, Iran lacked a constitution. However,
beginning in 1905, several factors coalesced to provide an impetus to
create a constitution."3 Chief among these factors xwas a desire to
eradicate the influence of foreign powers within Iran," coupled with
See id at 3 (explaining the limited role of political rulers within Shia Islam).
Seeid.
s See id. at 4-5.
Id- at 5 (explaining that Shi'ites have both tacitly and expressly accepted secular govern-
ment as a social necessity).
10 See iU (stating that Shi'ites believe that secular rulers had no right to legislate but, rather,
had only the right to "issue decrees... to meet [the] administrative and judicial needs of the
day.").-
aiOD, supra note 3, at 5.
12 See PARviz DANEsHvAR, REVOLUTION IN IRAN 3-5,5 (1996) (CThe intellectuals... blamed
the country's waning fortunes on despotism and a lack of democratic institutions, which could
provide checks and balances against the Qajars [the d)asty that ruled Iran from 179619251.-).
Is See M. REZA GHODS, IRAN IN THETWENTIETH CENTURY: A POLITICAL HIsTom'30 (1939).
14 See Mobsen Milani, Shi'ism and the State in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, rn
IRAN: POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE ISLAhMIC 133, 135 (Samih K Farsoun & Mchrdad Mashayekhi
eds., 1992) (describing the constitutional revolution's extensive roots in both international and
internal affairs).
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a strong desire to reform the political system.'5 Two of the major
groups demanding these changes were philosophical antagonists:
the intellectuals and the ulema, or clergy." The intellectuals sought
an end to the political corruption that had become entrenched in
Iran and to separation of religion and state. 7 The ulema, as might be
expected, sought a more expansive role for religion within both gov-
ernment and society." To reach their goals these two groups were
forced to reach a rapprochement.'9
On August 5, 1906, the Shah,20 bowing to popular pressure,
agreed to the establishment of a committee to draft a constitution.2'
The resulting constitution, signed by the Shah on December 30,
1906,22 was based heavily on the Belgian constitution of 1831,23 and
provided for the establishment of a Parliament, or Majles, which was
first convened in October 1906.24
The constitution, and the supplementary laws added to it by the
Parliament, sought to appease the ulema by giving Islam a broad role
in the new government. Article 1 declared Shi'ism to be the state
religion.26 Article 2 provided for the creation of an ecclesiastical
committee, which sought to ensure that all legislation conformed to
Islam.27 Articles 20 and 21 banned all publications and associations
that were detrimental to Islam.2 Lastly, Article 27 established a two-
Ghods discusses the increasing foreign influence in Iran throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury. This influence came primarily from the European powers, particularly Britain and Russia,
two nations that exploited Iran's internal political weaknesses to establish "spheres of [eco-
nomic] influence" for their own benefit. See CHODS, supra note 13, at 17.
15 See Milani, supra note 14, at 135 (placing the impetus for this reform in a "new element,
the people's power"). See also SAID AMIR ARJOMAND, THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN: THE
IsLAMIc REVOLUTION IN IRAN 36 (1988) (describing the political system in Iran prior to the 1906
Constitutional Revolution as one marked by "[mlisgovernment, tyranny, and injustice").
16 See 0MID, supra note 3, at 252.
17 See MOHAMMED AMJAD, IRAN: FROM ROYAL DICTATORSHIP TO THEOCRACY 38 (1989) (de-
scribing the breakdown of revolutionary leadership into distinct groups).
18 See OMID, supra note 5 at 13 (discussing various interests motivating the ulema).
19 See id. at 14 (elaborating on the uneasy alliance formed between intellectuals and tie
ulema).
"Shah" is the generic term for the hereditary leader of Iran. Through the first quarter of
the twentieth century, this position was held by members of the Qajar line. In 1925, Reza Shah
Pahlavi, the commander of the armed forces of Iran, declared himself Shah. The Pahlavi's re-
tained control until 1979 when they were ousted by the Islamic Revolution. See ERVAND
ABRAHAMIAN, RADICAL ISLAM: THE IRANIAN MOJAHEDIN 11 (Society and Culture in the Modern
Middle East Series) (Michael Gilsenan ed. 1989).
21 See AMIR, supra note 15, at 37 (describing agitation that culminated in the committee's
establishment).
2 See id. at 38.
23 See Milani, supra note 14, at 135 (discussing the structure of the 1906 Constitution). Be-
cause of the need for a quickly-written constitution, European-educated secular reformers re-
lied heavily on the Belgian Constitution as a model. See GHODS, supra note 13, at 31.
24 See CHODS, supra note 13, at 31.
25 See Milani, supra note 14, at 135.
26 See id. at 136.
27 See id.
28 See id.
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tiered judicial system consisting of: a clergy-administered court to
deal with religious issues and a government-administered civil court
to deal with secular issues.!
Although Islam had an expansive role in the new government, in-
ternal debate raged within the uei= over the legitimacy of the consti-
tution.3 ° An analysis of the opposing positions is instructive, not only
in understanding events surrounding the 1906 Constitution, but also
because these issues, debated and left unresolved in 1906, resurfaced
in 1979, and are still contentiously debated in Iran today.
The two main issues of debate within the ulema were, first, what
role, if any, a secular constitution should play in an Islamic society,
and second, what role, if any, the people should play in the govern-
ment. On one side of the debate was the relatively moderate Mirza
Muhammad-Hossein Gharavi-Na'ini, who gave limited support to the
constitution."1 On the other side was the more conservative Ayatollah
Fazlollah Nuri, who opposed it.32 Na'ini granted limited support to
the constitution because he saw the constitutional system of govern-
ment as compatible with Islam, which was itself "essentially constitu-
tional because of its reliance on religious and civil laws."" Although
no government outside that of the twelve imans was truly legitimate, a
constitutional government at least served to "limit[] the rulers' arbi-
trary power and grant[ed] people limited sovereignty," and was
therefore "less abhorrent than other forms" of government." Na'ini
seemed to be arguing that lay-people should therefore play a role in
government.
Ayatollah Nuri argued that the various freedoms given to the peo-
ple by the constitution were antithetical to Islam, because "sover-
eignty belonged to God, the prophet, and the Ulema .... [T]he
masses had no right to exercise sovereignty."" He further stated, as
Khomeini would several decades later, that "God alone is the law-
maker in Islam" and His laws are to be "understood and disseminated
by the learned clergy."s6 As such, there was no room for the people in
government. In the end, this debate proved inconsequential. The
constitution was passed despite the objections of the conservative fac-
tion of the u/ema. Its passage, however, proved to be a hollow victory
for the more moderate clergy because the constitution and the rights
SeeMilani, supra note 14, at 136.
5D See id at 135-36 (describing the rift ithin the ukma).
31 See id at 136.
32 See id.
33 Id
!4 Milani, supra note 14, at 136 (quoting A. HAIRI, SHI'ISM AND CoNsTITnoNAUS.%UM LN IR..
165-97 (1977), and ENAYAT op. cit., 160-74).
MAJAD, supra note 17, at 38 (quoting S. AKHAVI, RELIGION AND POLITICS LN C01.7MPORk
IRAN: CLERGY-STATE RELATIONS IN THE PAHLAVI PERIOD 26-35 (1980)).
5OMm, supra note 5, at 15.
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it provided were ignored by a succession of ruling secular monarchs."
Under the reign of the Pahlavi7 family, the ulema were silenced,
the promised ecclesiastical committees never met, popular participa-
dlon was non-existent, and the parliament was made subservient to
the Shah.39 The intelligentsia and the ulema, moderates and conser-
vatives alike, had failed in their attempts to reform the political sys-
tem. These groups would have to wait until 1979 for their next
chance to effect change.
II. CAUSES OF THE 1979 REVOLUTION
Both economic and political factors led to the 1979 revolution
that brought theocracy to Iran. ° Mismanagement and reckless
spending by the Shah had weakened the economy, while political
rights and expression were curtailed by the Shah, who abrogated all
political parties in favor of a single party controlled by the monarch
himself.
4
A. Mismanagement of the Economy
As a result of the Arab oil embargo of the early 1970's, Iranian
revenues from oil sales rose dramatically, quadrupling from $5 billion
to $20 billion per year.42 With this infusion of capital, the Shah un-
dertook a campaign of massive spending aimed at turning Iran into a
major military and industrial power.4 To implement this program,
Iran began to import a tremendous amount of goods from the West.
4
The Iranian infrastructure, however, proved incapable of handling
this influx of goods.4' For example, "[b]y mid-1975, ships had to wait
160 days to unload their goods-and when goods were unloaded,
there was nowhere to house them."
4 6
The agricultural sector provides another illustration of the mis-
management and lack of planning that undermined the Shah's ef-
forts.4 In an attempt to modernize the countryside, the Shah or-
dered that small farms be consolidated into giant ones.4s However,
37 See Milani, supra note 14, at 137-38.
38 SeeABRAHANIIAN, supra note 20, at 11.
49 See generally BAKHASH, supra note 3, at 10-18.
40 See id. (explaining that "economic, social, and political dislocations in Iran created a fer-
tile round for Khomeini's radical ideas").
See id at 11.
42 See id& at 12.
43 See GHODS, supra note 13, at199.
44 See id.
45 See id
46 1& (observing that the Shah's programs were undertaken primarily to "foster Iran's inter-
national prestige rather than economic independence or cost effectiveness").
47 See id. at 200.
48 See GHODS, supra note 13, at 200.
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the resulting farms were "too large for maximum efficiency and suf-
fered from a lack of planning (in crop choices and budget forecasts)
and skilled management."49 Therefore, while food production did in-
crease initially, it "did not keep pace with Iran's three percent annual
population growth."5
The Shah's desire that Iran become a regional military power fur-
ther drained the country of its resources. Benefiting from the im-
plementation of the Nixon Doctrine, which sought to lessen reliance
on American forces by providing countries like Iran with advanced
weaponry, and using his new-found oil-generated wealth, the Shah
went on a military spending spree. 5' Between 1972 and 1976, Iran
purchased $10 billion in American arms.2
The Shah's poorly planned and mismanaged policies had negative
consequences for the Iranian economy. Inflation rose from "9.9 per
cent in 1975 to 16.6 per cent in 1976 and then to 25.1 per cent in
1977.""s Meanwhile, oil revenues dropped from "$21.8 billion in
1976/77 to $21.3 billion in 1977/78."s'
B. Suppression of Political Rights
The other major cause of popular dissatisfaction with the Shah
concerned his extreme political policies. To further consolidate his
control, the Shah announced, in 1975, the abolishment of all political
parties in favor of a single party-the Rastakhiz party-created by
him.55 All citizens were forced to join the new party and those who
resisted were told by the Shah that they were "free to get their pass-
ports and leave the country."5 The new party was viewed by many
Iranians as an infringement on their political rights and as a further
means for those loyal to the Shah to enrich themselvesY5
The ulema, whose representation in the legislature had signifi-
candy declined by the 1970's,5s were particularly upset with the Shah,
who in addition to cutting state subsidies to the ulema," attempted to
50 Id.
51 See id. at 201-03. The Nixon Doctrine was implemented to 'strengthen smaller allies' de-
fenses, so they would remain pro-Western but would not have to rely on U.S. troops.' Id.
-2 See id.
5s DANESHVAR, supra note 12, at 95 (quoting, Thomas Walton, Economic Dewlopwrnt and Re-o.
lutionamy Upheavals in Iran, 4 CAMBRIDGEJ. OF ECON. 271-92 (1980)).
5GHODS, supra note 13, at 204.
55 SeeDANESHvAR, supra note 12, at72.
56 It (quoting the Shah's Speech, March 1975 in Iran Almanac (1977)).
57 See id. at 73. ("The party was used by many groups for rapid promotions and fast career
tracks to positions of power, by showing intense loyalty to its principles.').
See GHODS, supra note 13, at 206 ("Only 1 percent of deputies to the Twenty-first Majtis
were clergy").
See id. at 206 (showing that the u/ema were dependent on the State as a source of revenue,
but in 1977, "the government drastically cut its subsidies to the ulle] ma").
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
gain legitimacy for his throne in 1975 by replacing the Islamic calen-
dar with a secular one that dated back to the time of Cyrus the
GreatY6 The intellectuals and the clergy, outraged by the Shah's
autocratic rule; angered by his disregard for the constitution;6' and
convinced that Iran was under the control of foreign governments,
particularly the United States, 62 once again united, as they had done
in 1906.65
C. GrowingDissent
As a result of their dissatisfaction with the Shah's policies, many
people began to turn toward Islam.6 Demonstrations sprang up
across the country against the Shah, who responded by sending his
secret police force---SAVAKt-to attack the protestors.6 In January
1978, violence escalated further in response to the appearance of an
article in the newspaper Ittilaat that attacked both the clergy and Aya-
67tollah Ruhollah Khomeini, one of the leaders of the opposition.
The article was believed to have been placed there by the Shah.8 The
article touched off mass demonstrations that began in the religious
city of Qom and spread throughout the country.9 Government
workers contributed to this movement against the Shah by going on
strike, thereby paralyzing the bureaucracy.
7
.
The spreading violence allowed Ayatollah Khomeini to assume
leadership of the movement against the Shah.7' These protests cul-
60 See id. (explaining the Shah's decision was "clearly an attempt to attain political legitimacy
for the monarchy at the clergy's expense").
61 See DANESHVAR, supra note 12, at 82 ("The Shah was seen as a dictator rather than a mon-
arch, and his failure to observe the law and establish a credible parliamentary system had
brought the legitimacy of the monarchy itself into question.").
62 See id& (explaining how the Shah's close ties with the West had "become synonymous with
the import of decadence from the West"). The term 'Westoxification,' was used by some Irani-
ans to describe Iran which, according to the Shah's critics, "had become a nation of imitators
who only copied the superficial aspects of modern living without any regard[] to substance or
acceptability." Id.
See id- at 5 ("The 1906 constitutional revolution was a direct consequence of a period of
'awakening of the intellectuals to the problems of the country and the expansionist policies of
the superpowers, [that] ... forged an alliance between the intellectuals and some segments of
the clerical establishment.'"). See also OMID, supra note 3, at 14.
See DANESHVAR, supra note 12, at 82 (stating that the Shah had "established his power
and authority by suppressing all opposition forces who were critical of his authoritarian rule"),
SAVAK is an abbreviation of Sazman-e Ittilaat va Amniat-e Keshvar, Iran's intelligence and
security organization. See id. at 41.
6 See id. at 102.
67 See id. The article accused the clergy of being allied with the communists in an attempt to
overthrow the government. Additionally, it accused Khomeini of having written erotic poetry
and of having "homosexual tendencies".
See id. at 101 ("According to a number of sources, the article was instigated by the Shah
himself, who had become concerned over the rise in Khomeini's popularity.").
69 See GHODS, supra note 13, at 217.
70 See id. at 218.
71 See DANESHVAR, supra note 12, at 102("[Khomeini] directly accused the Shah of under-
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minated in September 1978 when government forces and demonstra-
tors engaged in a bloody clash in Jaleh Square, in Tehran. 2 Shortly
after this clash, the Shah left Iran, and Khomeini and his followers
took control of the country."
I. KHOMEINI'S VELAYAT-EFAQIH
The theoretical foundation for the government established by
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 was his view of the relationship between
Islam and the state as codified in his work V"eIa)at-e Faqi.7 Translated
as "[G]overnment of the Islamic (rnurists,"-5 this work is a compen-
dium of lectures delivered by Khomeini to his students in the city of
Najaf, Iraq in 1969,76 six years after he had been exiled by the Shah
for his criticism of the regime." In Vieaytl-e Faqih, Khomeini pro-
pounded the view that there should be no distinction between relig-
ion and government in an Islamic state.' Like Ayatollah Nuri,
Khomeini believed that modem government should closely resemble
the theocratic Muslim community of the early years of Islam in which
the only legitimate rulers are the clergy, who have assumed the man-
tle of leadership directly from Mohamad through the hnams.9 The
principle that "'the foqaha, religious leaders, are the trustees of the
Prophet,' means that all tasks entrusted to the Prophet must also be
fulfilled by the foqaha... as a matter of duty.""" There is no doubt,
according to Khomeini, that "the imnam... designated the foqaha...
to exercise the functions of both government and judgeship. " '
Khomeini based his concept of rule by the dergy on the Koran:
"0 you believers, obey God, obey the prophet and obey those in
charge among you.""2 According to Khomeini, those in charge after
mining Islam. He further condemned the Shah for his close collaboration with the U.S. which,
he claimed was going to destroy Iranian culture, Islam and the economy. Thus he added a new
and important dimension to the uprisings: Islam and the external factor.').
72 See GHODS, supra note 13, at 218 ("The massacre, called Black Friday, ended any hope that
the [S]hah had ever had of reaching a compromise uith reformist elements anmong tie relig-
ious opposition.").
73 See id. at 219.
7 See BAKHASH, supra note 3, at 38 (discussing Khomeini's "basically revolutionary concept
of the Islamic state").
Id. But see OMaD, supra note 3, at 40 (translating Vd.at-e Faqih as 'Rule by a wise religious
leader.").
76 SeeBAKHASH, supra note 3 at 38.
77 See OMD, supra note 3, at 31, 38 (stating that upon his exile in 1963. Khomeini went first
to Turkey, then Iraq, and finally to Paris).
78 See i4. at 62 ("[I]n Valayat[-e] Faqih, Khomeini postulates a future govemment by a group
of like-minded, and high-minded, clergy, who submit themselves to the wil of God and merely
prescribe the Islamic dictum for the population to follow.").
79 See id. at 5 ("[U] niversal authority rests with the Imam.").
so OMm, supra note 3, at 59(quoting LWAMN KHOMEINI, ISLAM AND REVOLLMTON: IVRriNGS
AND DECLARATIONS OF LMAM KHOMEINi 7&79, 96 (Hamid Algar trans.. 1980).
81 Id. at 60.
AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOEYNI, ISLAMIC GO\.rNME&1r 9 Uoint Publications Research
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the prophet, the Imams, had "been entrusted with explaining the Is-
lamic laws and rules and with disseminating them among the Mos-
lems."83 In the absence of the Imams, "[t]he just jurisprudents have
been required to carry out these tasks.
84
Khomeini believed that this system of government would be di-
vinely inspired because God has given this government "the same
powers that he gave the prophet... In regard to ruling, justice and
the settlement of disputes... [and] the collection of taxes and the
development of the country. "85 In addition, Islamic government dif-
fered from secular forms of government in that "the power of legisla-
tion is confined to God... and nobody else has the right to legis-
late.
, 86
Khomeini envisioned a government led either by a single member
of the clergy, faqih, or by a group of clergy, foqaha. "If competence
for this task is confined to one person, then this would be his duty to
do so corporeally, otherwise the duty is shared equally. "88 Two impor-
tant qualifications a ruler must possess are knowledge of Islamic law
and the "faculty" of justice. "You can see that whoever governs or
dispenses justice among the people must be an imam knowledgeable
in the laws and the rules and must be just."90 Such a ruler, when
found, "will have as much control over running the people's admini-
stration, welfare and policy as the prophet. "." Khomeini saw this
ruler in paternalistic terms, in that "[t]he task of a trustee over an en-
tire people is not different from that of the trustee over minors, ex-
cept quantitatively."92 A strong leader is needed because the people
are, generally, "devout, simple-minded and intellectually docile."'"
Khomeini also envisioned a modem Islamic government as one in
which "[r] eligious taxes meet all the state's expenditure and religious
courts dish out justice on an immediate and satisfactory basis ....
There is no need for elections and representative government, be-
cause the laws are prescribed by Islam and the clergy have emerged as
the best guides and have reluctantly accepted the burden of govern-
ment."94
Although, Khomeini offered an alternative form of government,
Service trans., Translations on Near East and North Africa, No. 1897, 1979) (1969-1970).
83 Id.
84 Id.
M Id. at 21.
6 Id. at 17.
87 See Saffari, supra note 4, at 64, 65, 77.
tKHoMEyNi, supra note 82, at 22.
89 See id. at 19, 20.
90 Id. at 35.
91 Id. at 21.
92 Id. at 21-22.
9 OMID, supra note 13, at 62 (theorizing that Khomeini believed the Iranian people should
"accept the rule of the clergy and follow their instruction to the letter").
94 Id.
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in his lectures, he spoke in theoretical terms.3 Nowhere did he set
out specifics for the implementation of such a system. J Also prob-
lematic was Khomeini's assumption that a system of government from
the seventh century would be adequate to meet all of the needs of a
modem state.97 Almost as soon as he gained power, Khomeini was
forced to adjust his theoretical model to conform with reality."
IV. THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION: 1979
In January 1979, ten years after the delivery of his lectures on the
subject of Velayat-e Faqih, Khomeini returned from exile to Iran."
Upon returning, he ordered the implementation of a "dual" system
of government in which a Provisional Government, "dominated by
secular ... liberals," and a Revolutionary Council "dominated by cler-
ics and Khomeini himself," would share power.t" From the outset,
however, real power was exercised by the Revolutionary Council. The
Provisional Government was merely a "front"'0 ' for the clergy, who
tolerated the government's existence while they consolidated their
clerical power.0 2  What developed was a system of government
wherein the Revolutionary Council "provided guidelines and rulings
for changes, which the Provisional Government enacted in the daily
running of the state."'
On March 30 and 31, 1979, a referendum was held in which the
people were asked whether they supported the Islamic Republic im-
posed by Khomeini and his followers.'O' The people approved of the
government. Khomeini, claiming a ninety-eight percent approval rat-
ing by the people, "instructed the provisional government to draw up
an Islamic constitution."0 5
The draft constitution, which was secular in nature, was prepared
by the Provisional Government and based upon the Iranian Constitu-
tion of 1906 and the constitution of France's Fifth Republic.'** The
constitution created a strong presidency while omitting any reference
%5 See id.
97 See id.
, See DANE SHVAR, supra note 12, at 136; OMim, supra note 3, at 130.
9See OMID, supra note 3, at 63.
100 SeeNikkie R. Keddie, Introducion to THE IRANIAN RE'OLUTION & THE ISLtiC REPUBU1C 11
(Nikdde R. Keddie & Eric Hoogland eds., 1986).
'0' SeeDANEsHvAR, supra note 12, at 131.
102 See Cheryl Bernard & Zalmay Khalilzad, THE GOERN.iNT OF GOD - IRAN'S I, StAc
REPUBuC 105 (1984).
103 Robin Wright, IN THE NAME OF GOD: THE KHOMEINI DECADE 66 (1989).4 see OMD, supra note 3, at 65-66.
105 Id. at 66.
106 See BAXHASH, supra note 3, at 74 (noting that the constiution was an extension of a partial
draft which had been prepared in Paris by Khomeini's followers during his exile).
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to the position of Faqih.10 7 In addition, while a Council of Guardians
was established to review all laws, ensuring their compliance with Is-
lam, it was given only "limited veto powers" and the majority of its
members were "lay judges, not Islamic jurists."
0 8
The draft was approved by the cabinet of the Provisional Govern-
ment and by the Revolutionary Council.' 9 Khomeini agreed to the
draft "o with the understanding that provisions allowing women the
right to hold the presidency and judgeships were to be removed."'
The initial draft was so acceptable to Khomeini that he was willing to
bypass the remaining steps in the drafting process and submit it di-
rectly to the people in a referendum."' This suggestion, however,
sparked protest from a number of groups. "
The more conservative elements within the ulema were upset with
the draft constitution's omission of the role of the Faqih and the neg-
ligible role it offered them in the new government.' These clergy
realized that "without constitutional assurances," as to their role in
the new government, "and upon Ayatollah Khomeini's death," their
newly acquired positions of power would be placed in great jeop-
ardy."5 The ulema, therefore, supported a revision of the constitu-
tion."6 Khomeini, too, came to realize that unless he became more
active in promoting the role of Islam and the clergy in the new con-
stitution and government, the revolution would turn "towards a
democratic system, with little room for the religious institutions to
dictate policies."" 7 Khomeini therefore agreed to the establishment
of an elected Assembly of Experts, which would be "empowered to
amend and redraft the constitution."""
During the ensuing campaign for seats in the Assembly of Experts,
Khomeini's Islamic Republican Party (IRP) presented the largest
slate of candidates."9 While its secular opposition "remained frag-
mented," and without a "coherent agenda," the IRP skillfully utilized
107 See id.
108 Id.
109 See id.
110 See OMID, supra note 3, at 66 (suggesting that Khomeini supported the constitution, de-
spite its omission of any reference to the Faqih, because he felt that the position of Faqih would
.emerge as a matter of course" and that the people of Iran would, nevertheless, "obey his every
command.").
I See id. at 66.
112 See BAKHASH, supra note 3, at 74.
11 See id
114 See Saffari, supra note 4, at 67.
115 See id.
16 See id
117 0MID, supra note 3, at 66. Khomeini reacted by "publicly criticizing the draft constitution
for being insufficiently Islamic." Id. His supporters came to his aid by "stressing the require-
ment of adhering to the rule by Faqih as the sine qua non," of the new Islamic society. Id.
110 BAKHASH, supra note 3, at 75.
19 See Saffari, supra note 4, at 64, 67 (quoting Enqelab-e Eslami, 15 MORDAD 1358 (August 6,
1979)).
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mosques and successfully publicized the endorsements it had re-
ceived from the clergy and Ayatollah Khomeini.'2 As a result, the IRP
won a landslide victory, securing more than two-thirds of the 73 seats
up for election.1
2
1
Khomeini addressed the Assembly of Experts at its inaugural
meeting, warning the delegates that the constitution must be "one
hundred percent Islamic," and that "discussion of proposals contrary
to Islam lies outside the scope of [the Assembly's] mandate."'- To
ensure that the proposals were of an Islamic nature, the delegates
elected two staunch supporters of Khomeini: Ayatollah Montazeri,
who was elected chairman, and Ayatollah Beheshti, who was elected
vice-chairman123 The Assembly was divided into seven committees,
each of which was assigned a portion of the draft constitution on
ehich to work.124 The articles revised by the various committees were
to be presented to the full house for a vote. *2s
One committee within the Assembly of Experts was called the
Goals of the Constitution Committee (GOCC). The suggestions of
this committee aroused some of the strongest debate over the role of
the faqihY.2 6 The GOCC was chaired by Beheshti and filled with his
IRP colleagues, all of whom were ardent supporters of rule by a
faqih12 One of the first articles brought to the full house was Article
5, which had been written by Beheshti himself."-' This article pro-
posed the constitution's adoption of rule by a single faqih. Article 5
stated that, "[t]he governance and leadership of the nation devolve
upon the just and pious faqih who is acquainted with the circum-
stances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of adminis-
trative ability."
That the GOCC took less than two weeks to pass Article 5, demon-
strates the lack of "substantive debate and opposition in the Goals of
the Constitution Committee."'s Once it reached the full house of the
Assembly, however, it did encounter some opposition."' Several
delegates had reservations about, or were completely opposed to, the
1 See id.
121 See id at 68. The IRP thereafter "paralyzed" the pro isiona government by 'forming a
peripheral government and constantly challeng[ing] (its] policies." Id.
BAKHASH, supra note 3, at 81 (quoting Enqdabe Eslami, 28 MORDAD 1358 (August 19.
1979)).
122 See Saffari, supra note 4, at 68.
124 See id. at 68.
125 See i&
126 Seei
127 See id.
128 See Saffari, supra note 4, at 69 (quoting 1 Surat-e Mashnhe Afozawae.e laflMe-e Bafrasi-ye
Neha'i-ye Qanun-e Asasi.e Iran [The Complete Collection of Final Debates of the Assembly on
the Constitution of Iran] 376 (Tehran, 1985)).
129 Id. at 69 (quoting THE CONSTITUTION OF THE IsLAMIc REPUBuc OF IRAN 29 (Hamid .Agar
trans., Berkeley, 1980)).
1s0 I.
1 See id. at 71.
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incorporation of the position of Faqih into the constitution. 2 One
such critic was Ezzatollah Sahabi, who argued that " Velayat-efaqih does
not mean that the faqih should be involved in day-to-day politics ....
The faqih has certain qualities which are needed, but not enough for
a political leader in today's society. " , 3 Sahabi also criticized the no-
tion of Velayat-e faqih on religious grounds, adopting the same posi-
tion that Ayatollah Na'ini had taken during the 1906 debates. Sa-
habi argued that "absolute rule belongs only to God and the infallible
Imams; human beings cannot be under the absolute rule and subjec-
tion of anyone except them.",
35
Another critic, Hojjati Kermani, argued that in today's complex
world, a religious leader does not possess the requisite knowledge to
lead the people: "It is no longer enough for a faqih to know the de-
tails of his province, or even possess enough knowledge about the
Iranian revolution. The concerns of Iran are insignificant compared
to those of the international community .... Kermani also stated
that the faqih is ill equipped to deal with modern society without
"knowledge and understanding of social, economic, and legal mat-
ters." 7
However, these moderate clerics were not only out-numbered, but
out-maneuvered procedurally by Beheshti's "deft handling of the As-
sembly." ss Beheshti "used his position [as chairman] to cut off de-
bate when necessary, to interpret the gist of the discussions as he saw
fit, and to present the 'official' view of critical articles of the constitu-
tion."'39 As a result, Article 5, providing for rule by a single faqih, was
passed.4 °
In addition to Article 5, the Assembly approved several other arti-
cles pertaining to the role of the Faqih. 41 Article 107 established an
additional Assembly of Experts whose job it would be to select a re-
placement for Khomeini. This Assembly would "[r] eview and con-
sult among themselves concerning all persons qualified to act as
132 See id.
133 Id. at 71 (quoting Enqelab-e Eslami, 30 MORDAD 1358 (August 21, 1979). The opposition
wanted a leader with "knowledge and understanding of social, economic and legal matters" and
they felt that Khomeini was only expert in religious matters. See id. This religious opposition to
Khomeini should not be misunderstood as a rejection of theocracy or a government based on
Islam but, rather, of Khomeini's assumption of total control. See id.
14 SeeSaffari, supra note 4, at 72.
135 1I (quoting Surat-e Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e Barrasi-ye Neha'i-ye Qanun-e Asasi-ye Iran 89
(1985)).
13 Id. at 71 (quoting Enqelab-eEslami, 10 SHAHRIVAR 1358 (September 1, 1979)).
137 M
138 While Beheshti "did not always have his way," he focused on the "essentials and kept the
discussions in a chamber of prickly and senior clerics," sympathetic to his views. See BAKfIAsI-I,
sura note 3, at 82.
139 Id. at 82-83.
140 See id. at 83.
141 See Saffari, supra note 4, at 73.
142 See id.
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maja4 and leader. If they discern outstanding capacity for leader-
ship in a certain maija, they will present him to the people as their
leader; if not, they will appoint either three or five inaras,"'" until a
single leader could be found. Article 107 is also significant for what it
omitted. The article failed to provide any means for removing
Khomeini as Faqih should a need arise. '4 This lack of reference to
removal demonstrated just how powerful Khomeini had become.
The composition of the additional Assembly of Experts was dele-
gated, by Article 108, to a twelve member Guardianship Council
which was also "granted the authority to examine all legislation for
compliance with the Shari'a (law of God) and the Constitution.""" Of
the twelve members, six were to be appointed by Khomeini and six by
the SupremeJudicial Council and the Maj's.7
A 'Leadership Council' was designated by Article 109 "to be
elected if the future Assembly of Experts failed to agree on a single
faqih for leadership."' If no sultable replacement was present, the
Republic would function under "collegial leadership."" This situa-
tion never presented itself, however, because six years later, in 1985,
the Assembly, with Khomeini's approval, selected Ayatollah Montaz-
eri to succeed Khomeini upon his death.'"
Article 110 specified the powers held by the Faqih, which included
the power to select and remove the heads of the armed forces, as well
as judicial officials."' The Faqih could also remove political candi-
dates who were not sufficiently religious.5 2 The Faqih also had the
power to "appoint members of the Supreme Defense Council and
declare peace or war, based on the recommendations of this Coun-
cil."153 In addition to the powers of the Faqih, the constitution set out
and established the qualifications for the offices of President, Prime
Minister, Parliament, and the Judiciary. 4
4 Omid translates maja as the "highest ranking religious leader," and a "source of emula-
tion." 0MiD, supra note 3, at 250.
4 Saffari, supra note 4 at 73 (quoting THE CONSTrnTu-ION OF THE ISL Mc REPUBUC OF IW.:
66 (Haild Algar trans., 1980)).
'4 See geerally OMiD, supra note 13, at 67. When writing Valkat-e Faqih, Khomeini had 'as-
sumed that the Islamic ruler would be... de-selected if he failed to bejust." Id
14 Saffari, supra note 4, at 74.
147 SeeOMID, supra note 3, at 131.
IQ Saffari, supra note 4, at 75 ("The members of the Leadership Council were required to
have the same religious standing and qualifications as the faqih.").
149 See OMm, supra note 13, at 135.
M See id. at 136.
1 SeeSaffari, supra note 4, at 75.
1 See id
15 Id ("Interestingly, opposition to this article came almost exclusively from the 'moderate'
faction, which had voted for the initial article establishing thefaqih's role, but now disagreed on
the extent of his power." One criticism of this article was that it infringed upon the power of
the PresidenL).
15 See HELEN CHAPIN METz, IRAN: A COUNTRYSTUDy 198-202 (Area Handbook Series, 19S9).
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The Assembly finished its revisions by November 1979.' These
changes, in line with Khomeini's wishes, had "laid the foundation for
a theocratic state."56 The revised constitution provided a central role
in the new government for the Faqih and the clergy.57 In addition, it"entrenched Islamic jurisprudence as the foundation of the country's
laws and legal system, and limited individual freedoms to what was
considered permissible under Islam.". 8  The constitution was ap-
proved in a plebiscite in December 1979."9
A. Problems of Implementation: Velayat-e Faqih in Action
1. Taxation
The theocratic government established by the revised constitution
soon found that implementing its own rhetoric in terms of "practical
day-to-day politics posed a problem that had no obvious solution."'
Several problems, unforeseen by Khomeini when formulating his no-
tion of the Faqih, emerged. 6' One such issue was taxation. In Velayat-
e Faqih, Khomeini had asked rhetorically whether there was "a differ-
ence between what the prophet and the imam collected and what the
present-day jurisprudent should collect?"' 62 Under that system, the
people were required only to pay taxes to support the poor, not the
state. Khomeini had mistakenly believed that the people would
voluntarily pay additional taxes to support the state, therefore, this
same system of taxation would suffice for present day Iran;'6 he was
wrong. The people refused to voluntarily pay additional taxes.' 6 The
result was that the government was not able to generate enough capi-
tal to support both its domestic needs and the ongoing war with
Iraq.'66 Khomeini was placed in a bind. On one hand, Iran needed
to generate revenue to survive. On the other hand, if Khomeini were
to call for an increase in taxation, he would effectively derogate from
the system implemented by the Prophet, the very system Khomeini
155 SeeBAKHASH, supra note 3, at 83.
15 Id.
157 See id
158 Id.
15 See Milani, supra note 14, at 150.
160 OMID, supra note 3, at 140-41.
161 See id
162 KHOMEYNI, supra note 82, at 9.
163 See OMID, supra note 3, at 141 ("The Shias are are expected to part willingly with one-
fourth of their surplus worldly goods, zakat, and one-fifth of their surplus liquid cash, khomns,
each year, to meet the needs of the poor and the needy; not those of the state and govern-
ment.").
164 See id
165 SeeOMID, supra note 3, at 141.
166 See id. ("The government needed an ever-larger income to fund the war and the state,
but... [t]wentieth-century Iranians were not quite as forthcoming as they should have been,
and the ulema saw no reason to pass what they obtained to the government.").
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had tried to imitate. Khomeini solved this dilemma by invoking the
principle of ejtehad, or "interpretation by a religious leader, to extend
the reylious duties of believers to the domain of payment of secular
taxes."
Khomeini justified this extension of the state's ability to tax by as-
serting that "[playment of such taxation is a religious duty. Just as
the Muslims have an obligation to pay their religious dues, so they
must also pay their national taxes to the Islamic government.
Khomeini's act of extending taxes beyond what Islam had called for
caused many to question whether his "support for the secular state
apparatus amount[ed] to a denial of his earlier teachings."'"
Khomeini's supporters came to his aid. Ayatollah Khatami, dis-
tinguishing between the 'basic' and 'temporal' laws, stated that
"[tihere are some absolute immovable laws of God that are eternal
and never changing; but the laws which govern the day-to-day ad-
ministration of the land may well change over time .... [D]ifferent
historical periods demand different regulations." '7a In further de-
fense of Khomeini's use of ej/ad, Hojatoleslam Hassan Marashi, a
member of the High Council of the Judiciary, stated that "[w]here
there are legal shortfalls, our constitution permits thejurisconsults to
pass a judgment based on religious texts and principles .... In
Shi'ism ejtehad is a basic and invaluable principle which enables the
jurisconsults to remedy all legal shortfalls and fill up all the legislative
gaps."
71
2. The Delegation of Authority
Another ambiguity created by the constitution wras whether the
absolute rule of the Faqih left any room for the "delegation of powers
and responsibilities" to other members of the government." The
constitution had placed responsibility with many, but had left real
power in the hands of the Faqih.'7 This question wras raised in an edi-
torial in the pro-government daily Kayhan: "[t]he question arises as
to whether the honourable representatives of the Valiyeh Faqih have
any right to make independent decisions or must they always turn to
the Faqih?"174
167 1&
16s Id (quoting Kayhan (July 9, 1987)).
169 d
17 OMID, supra note 3, at 142 (quoting Kay)han (February 6. 1988)).
17 Id. (quoting Kayhan (May31, 1987)).
17 See OMD, supra note 3, at 144 ("Khomeini's insistence on the overriding importance of
the ValiyehFaqih, the sole true representative of God on earth, [seemed to leave] little room for
anyone else.").
See id. at 145 ("IT]he tangled web of the Islamic constitution allocated responsibility to all
without giving anyone other than the Faqih any powers.").
174 See i at 144 (quoting Ka'han (January 24, 1988)).
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Khomeini's response to these questions came in the form of an
answer that he provided, in December 1979, to a question posed to
him by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The question dealt
with the ministry's ability to impose maternity leave on private em-
ployers. Khomeini responded that the ministry did have such power,
thereby clarifying the question of whether members of the govern-
ment were empowered to act independently of the Faqih. In addi-
tion, Khomeini used this opportunity to increase his own power. He
stated that citizens of an Islamic state must obey the orders of the
State.75 In a letter to Khamanei, then the President of Iran, Khome-
nei stated that "if the government can exercise its authority only
within the bounds of the peripheral divine laws, then the bestowal of
the divine ordinances through absolute deputyship upon the
Prophet... would be hollow and . Akhavi interprets
Khomeni to mean that "divine laws by themselves will not suffice to
ensure the well-being of the Muslims," the people need a Faqih to
lead them.Y7 Akhavi further states that "The logic behind the abso-
lute empowerment notion is that the establishment of an Islamic state
supervenes in its importance every other facet of Islam, because with-
out such a state, the very existence of Islam itself is in question.',
7
3. Internal Religious Dissention
Another source of challenge to Khomeini came from several
other religious leaders who took exception to the fact that Khomeini
had elevated himself above the other clergy.7 9 Traditionally, Shi'ite
religious leaders, marjas,'80 had led their followers with "little interfer-
ence from their colleagues." 8' Now a single leader, the Faqih was
"endowed with powers to overrule the religious decrees and authority
of other mar[jas]."'82 Khomeini had made himself into a singular
leader who had the "prerogative to overrule his... colleagues if the
[other] mar[jas] rulings hampered the ultimate objectives of the na-
175 See Shahrough Akhavi, Contending Discourses in Shili Law on the Doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih,
29 Nos. 3-4 IRANIAN STUDIEs 229, 262 (Summer/Fall 1996).
176 id.
177 Id. (quoting letters sent by Khomeini to Khamanei onJanuary 8, 1988).
178 Id. at 267. Khomeini's views were not supported by all. Critics argued that the authority to
suspend religious practices "such as prayer and pilgrimage, can come only at the hands of Al-
lah, acting through the Prophet and/or the Imams." Id.
179 See Saffari, supra note 4, at 77 ("A number of high-ranking [ulema] publicly declared their
opposition to the faqih articles and viewed them essentially as lacking a proper Islamic basis.").
See OMID, supra note 3, at 250 (defining marja as the "highest ranking religious leader;
source of emulation.").
181 Saffari, supra note 4, at 77.
182 The ability to overrule other religious leaders was extended notjust to the single Faqih but
also to the group of 3 to 5 religious leaders to be established, according to the constitution, in
the absence of a single leader capable of assuming power. See id.
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tion as seen fit by the faqih"lss
A leading critic of the notion of absolute leadership by a single re-
ligious leader was Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, who felt that the Faqih
should merely be an adviser, and should enter politics "only under
emergency conditions."'1  Shari'atmadari wrote that the people
should be the ones to lead, for the "foundation of the dissolution of
the former regime was a popular referendum; [thus] the will of the
people should also be the foundation of the new government." " In
defense of the constitution, Ayatollah Beheshti responded that
"Velayat-e Faqih does not repudiate popular voting because the people
must 'recognize and accept the faqi. ' " s6
4. Problems of Succession
The continuity of the government initially appeared to be ensured
by the designation of Ayatollah Montazeri as Khomeini's eventual
successor. Montazeri proved to be a member of the dissident clergy,
however, who, like Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, believed that the Faqih
should not be a single all-powerful leader but, rather, one who, "in
making important decisions... consults with experts and the learned
to ensure that his decisions are beneficial to society as a whole and do
not incur irreparable damage to the social fabric of Muslim na-
tions."'18 He also charged that the government had been guilty of "in-
justice [and] denial of people's rights."'6s
Montazeri's criticisms of the regime were seized upon by Presi-
dent Ali Khamanei and Speaker of the House Hashemi Rafsanjani,
"both favourite disciples of the Faqih, [who] felt themselves vlner-
able should Montazeri come to power."'o Both realized that Montaz-
eri was more learned than they were, and if it was "knowledge of Is-
lamic law that was to determine who was to run the country" both
"had much to lose."' 9 Both were, therefore, influential in convincing
Khomeini to dismiss Montazeri.' 9' Even after Montazeri was removed
183 Id.
ilani, supra note 23, at 149.
15 lI (quoting Etela'at, Mehr 19, 1358 (October 11, 1979)) (emphasis added).
18 Id at 142; see also Ahmad Kazemi Moussami, A New Intrpretation of the Theoi. of Vita-at-I
Faqih 28 Mm DLE EASTERN STUDIES 101 (January 1992) (discussing a new approach to tie le-
gitimization of the concept of Faqih, namely that of a dual layer of legitimacy bestowed both by
God and the people).
197 OID, supra note 3. (quoting 1Kahan (January 25, 1988)).
19 BAKHASH, supra note 3, at 283 (quoting Ka6'hana Havai (February 8. 1989)) (emphasis
added).
09 OMID, supra note 3, at 146.
1 See i,& at 147 ("Ralanjani... convince[d] Khomeini that the chosen heir... should never
become the nation's leader."). Although Khomeini dismissed Montazeri as his successor, he
did allow him to "continue functioning as a religious leader." fI
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as a threat, however, succession problems remained. 92 According to
Article 107 of the constitution, should no suitable candidate be found
to replace Khomeini, a "council of three or five religious leaders
would take charge of the leadership."'93 The problem for Khamanei
and Rafsanjani was that membership in such a group would consist of
the "leading ulema selected on the basis of knowledge and learning,
[and] would [therefore] not have included either."9 4 As a result,
both men encouraged Khomeini to revise the succession provisions
of the constitution.0
There was also a need to clarify the power structure in Iran and
delineate the powers of the President.99 This need, combined with
the campaign to revise the criterion for determining a successor,
compelled Khomeini to order, on April 25, 1989,' the creation of a
twenty member "Council of Reconsideration to revise the constitu-
tion."198
V. REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION: 1989
The Reconsideration Council, dominated by Khomeini's follow-
ers, abolished the post of prime minister, strengthened the position
of the presidency, 9and dealt with the leadership problem by amend-
ing the succession provisions of the constitution.200 Originally, the
constitution had required the Faqih to enjoy the "support of the deci-
sive majority of the people."29 ' When no individual enjoyed "massive
popular support, the Assembly of Experts, whose members are
elected, should appoint three or five recognized faqihs to the Leader-
ship Council which then becomes the country's supreme authority."
202
In contrast, Article 111 of the amended constitution stated that if
the previous leader has died, resigned, or been removed, a "council,
consisting of the President, the Head of the Judiciary, and one of the
foqaha of the Assembly of Experts, will perform the leader's responsi-
bilities. This council, which must be controlled by the ul[e]ma, will
192 See id. ("Montazeri's departure precipitated a constitutional crisis; there was no other suit-
able candidate to fulfill the functions of the Faqih.").
193 Id.
194 Id. ("Neither [Rafsanjani nor Khamenei] was likely to command public, let alone relig-
ious, backing.").
195 See id. ("It was imperative, in their interest.., to change the constitution.").
196 See id. at 148 ("The council was to disentangle the proliferation of command, [and] de-
lineate the limits of power and responsibilities of the President. ..
197 OMID, supra note 3, at 148.
19, Milani, supra note 14, at 150. Of the 20 members of the Council, Khomeini appointed 15.
The remaining 5 were appointed by the Parliament or Majiles. See id.
19 See Milani, supra note 14, at 151 ("The updated version ... centralizes political power by
strengthening the presidency and demolishing the post of prime minister....").200
See OMID, supra note 3, at 148 ("The council was to ... sort out the problem of the succes-
sion.").
201 Milani, supra note 14, at 151.
MId.
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lead the country until the Assembly of Experts selects a new leader." '
This elimination of the Leadership Council moved the country "away
from collective to single leadership."2
The major change to the constitution, however, was to the office
of the Faqih. The qualifications for the position were diminished
while its powers were expanded.s According to Article 109 of the
1989 constitution, the leader need no longer "be a maria (a source of
imitation with a considerable following who renders independent
judgment over a variety of issues) or enjoy the support of the major-
ity" of the people.26 Now "he need only be well-informed about feqh,
or about socio-political problems, or have popular legitimacy (art.
107), and must be 'just and pious.'"2"7
The Reconsideration Council increased the institutional powers
of the Faqih beyond even those that Ayatollah Khomeini had en-
joyed,ee for fear that lessening the Faqih's religious credentials would
have a concomitant deleterious effect on the way in which the Faqih
was perceived and obeyed by the people. For example, Article 110
gives to the ruler the power to determine the "general policies of the
Islamic Republic."M° This power is exercised in conjunction with a
Council of Determination of the Interests of the Republic, "which wras
designed to resolve the outstanding differences between the Majles
and the Council of Guardians." M  Article 112, however, declares that
the leader "will single-handedly determine the composition of this
new council."2n
Other powers given to Khomeini's successor were the ability to
"order referenda, delegate some of his duties and responsibilities to
others, and decide when to revise the Constitution. The unmodi-
fied constitution only granted the Faqih power to appoint six mem-
"M Milani, supra note 14, at 151.
V¢t Id. (explaining that just as Khomeini had consolidated power in his omn hands to the det-
riment of the other members of the ukma, so too here, the revised constitution provides for Ehe
consolidation of power in the hands of fewer people).
20 See id. at 151-52 ("Nor do the qualifications of the faqih remain the same.').
206 See i&
20 Id. at 152.
See id. at 152 ("[T]he leader['s] ... powers were extended beyond those of A)atollah
Khomeini's.").
"0 Milani, upra note 14, at152.210 Id-
211. As Milani explains;
This provision reduces the power of the Majles, and seems incompatible
with articles 6 and 56, which respectively make voting the basis of the ad-
ministration of the country'rsai... grants legislative power to the
Council for the Determination of the Interests of the Republic. all of
whose members are non-elected. Therefore, the power of the Majfts an
important symbol of the people's power, is restrained by two non-elected
bodies, the Council of Guardians and the Council for Determination of the
Interests of the Republic.
212 AT&
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bers of the Council of Guardians.213 Now Khomeini's successors can
both appoint and dismiss its members. 4 The revised constitution
also contains a new chapter, which gives the leader the power to re-
convene the Reconsideration Council.23 To do so, he is only re-
quired to consult with the Council of the Determination of the Inter-
ests of the Republic to "determine what must be revised or
amended."
21 6
The changes to the position of the Faqih did not go without criti-
cism. As to the lessened religious qualifications for the Faqih, critics
claimed that " [t] he demotion of the leader to the ranks of mere mor-
tals posed a serious problem of legitimacy for a state which is run on
the basis of absolute obedience to the laws of God and to the decrees
of his shadow on earth, the Valayateh Faqih.,2" The Faqih was sup-
posed to be infallible, yet the "revised constitution was going to ap-
point a mere human being, without sanctity, without superior relig-
ious learning... to rule over the country... the people were still
expected to obey this ruler as if he were a Valiyeh Faqih." 8 In defense
of the revised constitution, Khomeini's supporters among the ulema
argued that as long as the government "relies entirely on the laws of
Islam ... it will have the full support of the Muslims and the religious
leaders .... Should [the government] ever, God forbid, fail to do so,
then the religious leaders and the people of Islam will rise as one and
defeat it."
219
The members of the government defended revision of the consti-
tution by criticizing the newly-omitted notion of collegial rule.2 Pub-
lic Prosecutor Hojatoleslam Mousavi Khoyiniha argued that "consulta-
tion was unnecessary and collegiality merely an obstacle to efficiency:
'Collective leadership simply cannot work .... [I]t certainly has no
place in the judiciary. Our decision-making is not a consultativeRro-
cess, it is a matter of personal interpretation of the laws of God.'
Despite the criticism leveled against it, the revised constitution was
approved in a national referendum on July 28, 1989 and remains the
constitution currently in effect.222  Khomeini's death earlier that
213 See id. at 152 ("Ayatollah Khomeini could only appoint the members of the Council of
Guardians .... ).
214 See id ("[T]he leader can now appoint and dismiss them [Council members].").
215 See Milani, supra note 23, at 153 ("[T]he leader is given the power... to order the conven-
ing of the Reconsideration Council.")
16
217 OMID, supra note 3, at 149. Critics asked, "[i]f the Faqih, the highest source of emulation,
is not one and the same as the Vali, the ruler, then who has absolute authority and the right to
rule in the name of God?" Id.
218 Id. at 150.
219 Id. (quoting Interview with Public Prosecutor Mousavi Khoyiniha in Kayhan, April 20,
1989).
= See id. (citing examples of goverument figures defending the revised constitution).
S21 Id. at 150-151.
2n See BAKHASH, supra note 3, at 286.
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summer led the Assembly of Experts to convene and name President
Ali Khamenei as the new Faqik.
VI. THE DECLINE OF VELAYAT-EEAQIH
Despite these constitutional efforts to strengthen the powers of
the Faqih, Khomeini's death signaled the beginning of the decline of
the position in the eyes of many Iranians.- A major reason for this
negative perception is the fact that Khomeini's successor All Khame-
nei, who was "not even an Ayatollah at the time of his designation,"
lacks the religious credentials for the position.223
In addition to Khamenei's lack of religious standing, several other
factors have led to a growing dissatisfaction with the Faqih in general
and the ulema in particular; a dissatisfaction best expressed in May
1997's presidential victory by Mohammad Khatami over Speaker of
the Parliament Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri, who had been supported by
Ayatollah Khamenei and had been the ulemas' candidate of choice.22 '
The presidential election was significant for a number of reasons.
First, as one opposition leader, former foreign minister Ibrahim Yazdi
put it, "[f]or the first time we have had a campaign that [was] not be-
tween two individuals but actually between two different... out-
looks."227 In their campaigning, the two candidates clearly demon-
strated these two opposing outlooks. Khatami pledged to "respect
the privacy of citizens" and to protect their "civil rights and free-
doms."m  The cleric's choice, Nategh-Nouri, campaigned in favor of
rule by the u/ema.
The electoral victory of Khatami clearly demonstrated the peo-
ple's dissatisfaction with the clergy. The clerics had made it very clear
that they supported Mr. Nategh-Nouri. Yet, "[n]ot only did their
support fail to propel him to victory, it was also one of the main fac-
tors leading people to vote for Mr. Khatami."z '* In fact, Khatami won
a resounding victory. He received sixty-nine percent of the 29.1 mil-
lion votes cast, approximately 20.5 million votes, as compared to
22 See id ("Rafsanjani was elected the new president.").
224 SeeAkhavi, supra note 175, at 265 ("Khomeini's... death inJune 1989 led to a crisis.").
=5 See id. at 266. Khamanei is referred to simply as "leader," a purely secular term. This
term, while also used by Khomeini, referred not to Khomeini's religious capacity but to his 'po-
litical/administrative capacity as the overall authority in the system." Id.
2 SeeErlanger, supra note 1, at A4.
27 Stephen Kinzer, Voie for Change Makes Iran Vote a Real Race N.Y. TIMES. May 23. 1997. at
Al0 [hereinafter Kinzer, Voice for Change Makes Iran Vote a Real Ram-
22 Stephen Kinzer, Beating the System, Ith Bribes and the Big Li, N.Y. TIMES. May 27, 1997, at
A4 [hereinafter Kinzer, Beating the System, With Bribes and the Big Lie].
See Scott Macleod, Iran's Big ShftTIME,June 2. 1997, at 50.
2" Kinzer, Many Iranians Hope Mandate Brings Change, supra note 2. at A4. Contrst this re-
buff of the clergy with Khomeini's success in 1979 in getting his IRP candidates elected to the
Constitutional Assembly in ovenhelming numbers. Here, Khamanei was unable to get his one
candidate elected to office. See id.
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Nategh-Nouri, who received only twenty-five percent.21 Supporters of
Khatami assert that his victory represents a "second revolution.",
22
This theme was echoed by Ayatollah Montazeri, who, in a letter to
Khatami following Khatami's victory, stated that the election had
been a "popular revolution against the existing conditions... and a
clear message to all the authorities and officials of the country. '2"
Khatami's support was not limited to any particular region or
class, but cut across the Iranian political spectrum. "Mr. Khatami did
well not only in cities and towns, where intellectuals are concentrated
and where people are more resentful of the Government's social and
economic policies, but also in villages and rural outposts."2 4 Sup-
porters ranged from the young, who were upset with the regime's re-
strictive social policies, to women, who were angered by the regime's
dress code.2 5 Exacerbating this dissatisfaction with social conditions
was the general mismanagement displayed by the government. Un-
employment had reached twenty percent, inflation had grown to
twenty-five percent, and per-capita income had fallen from $1,200 at
the time of the Revolution to a present-day $800.2
6
The youth vote is particularly telling of the decline of the power of
the clergy. Seventy percent of the population of Iran is said to be
under 25 years of age, a constituency who do not "feel bound by the
ideology that brought the revolutionary Government to power." All
these young voters have seen of the Revolution are the intrusive social
polices that pervade and restrict their everyday lives. For example,
the clerical regime's police squads have routinely patroled the streets,
enforcing conformity with Islamic law.2"
Khatami has been perceived as a moderate since 1992, when he
was forced to resign his post as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guid-
ance.239 He had come into conflict with the more conservative ele-
ments within the government when he allowed the distribution of
certain books, magazines, and movies that were considered "subver-
231 See Stephen Kinzer, Moderate Leader is Elected in Iran by a Wide Margin, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
1997, at Al [hereinafter Kinzer, Moderate Leader is elected in Iran by a Wide Margin].
22 See Stephen Fairbanks, Iran's Democratic Efforts, MIDDLE EAST POL'Y, September 1997, at 51
("Unlike previous Iranian presidential elections where a prominent regime figure ran against
one or more no-names, this was a real contest, and the winner was not the one selected by those
holding the reins of power.").
235 Id.
2-U Kinzer, Moderate Leader is elected by a Wide Margin, supra note 231, at Al; see also Bahman
Baktiari, Iran's New President in MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT, Nov. - Dec. 1997, at 16, 17 ("Not only did
Khatami defeat Nategh-Nouri in the religious cities of Qum and Mashed, but also in Nategh-
Nouri's home province of Mazandaran ...
235 See Macleod, supra note 229, at 50.
2 See id. at S1.
27 Kinzer, Moderate Leader is Elected in Iran by a Wide Margin, supra note 231, at A1O.
238 See Kinzer, Beating the System, With Bribes and the Big Lie, supra note 228, at A4.
239 See Kinzer, A Cleric's Tolerant Orthodoxy Wins, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1997, at A1O [hereinafter
Kinzer, A Cleric's Tolerant Orthodoxy Wins].
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sive" by the more conservative clerics.2
A. Prospects for Change
While President Khatamni is, by all accounts, more moderate than
his predecessors, any analysis of his ability to effect change must con-
sider the fact that he is very much a part of the system he is seeking to
change. Mr. Khatami is not an outsider. To be allowed to run for the
presidency, he had to swear allegiance to the regime.'" It should also
be noted that Mr. Khatami may not have grasped the degree of frus-
tration with the current regime expressed by the people in their vote
for him. As Shaul Bakhash, an academic noted for his analysis on
Iranian affairs, has observed, Khatami "has emerged in the public eye
as a candidate of real change in a way he probably did not intend."'
1. Conservative Backlash
Clerical opposition to change in Iran is likely to be fierce, for the
ruling clerics "increasingly have come to fear for the position of the
clergy in government and even for the fundamental principle of the
Islamic Republic, velayat-e faqih."' These concerns are well-
founded. While criticism of the position of Faqih had in the past
been relegated to "esoteric intellectual magazines,"2 " the debate has
now begun to "spread to the public."24 Ayatollah Montezari's recent
criticism of the Faqih as being "too powerful" " has simply added fuel
to this debate. Another religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Nasser Ma-
karem Shirazi, stated in an interview with The New York Times that "he
fully expected that the question of the clergy's role would become an
enduring feature of the country's political debate, although he wras
"confident that most Iranians continued to support the system."2 7
The ulema have already begun to try to silence their critics, much
as the Shah did in his last days on the throne. The government has
stated its plans to charge Ayatollah Montazeri with treason for his
criticisms of the regime.2 ' A key ally of Khatami, Tehran's mayor
Gholamhossein Karabaschi, has been convicted on charges of corrup-
tion and mismanagement.249 This conviction has been seen as a vic-
240 Id
241 SeeKinzer, Voicefor Change Makes Iran Vote a Real Race, supra note 227. at A 10.
242 Erlanger, supra note 1, atA4.
2 See Macleod, supra note 229, at 54-55.
244 The Red Line, THE EcoNOMIST, November 29, 1997, at 48.
245 0 d
246 ,
247 DouglasJehl, Iranian Clerics Hint at Treason Trialfor Critir N.Y. TLMES, December 16. 1997,
at A8 [hereinafterJehl, Iranian Clerics Hint at treson Trial for Critic].
248 See id
249 SeeDouglasJehl, CloseAlly ofIran Chief is Sentenced toJail Term, N.Y. TL't Es. July 24. 1998, at
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tory for the conservatives, who had accused Karabaschi of supporting
Khatami's reform efforts.50 In addition, the ulema have also struck at
Khatami by closing down the daily Jameyah, a newspaper that had
been critical of the conservatives. 25' Also, the ulema successfully im-
peached Interior Minister Abdullah Nouri for allowing student or-
ganizations to conduct street demonstrations. 52
This conservative backlash, however, was not unexpected. As Ste-
phen Fairbanks, an analyst with the United States State Department,
has pointed out, while an initial "conservative backlash is inevita-
ble," it will ultimately give way to reform and to a lessening role for
the clergy. Fairbanks lists several reasons why he believes that Kha-
tami will succeed over clerical objections including the substantial
number of votes he received in his election, as well as the weakening
of the conservative clergy in the Majlis which resulted from the defeat
of its leader, Speaker Nategh-Nouri, in his bid for the presidency. 4
VII. CONCLUSION
A constitution is merely a document that reflects the values and
objectives of those who framed it. To remain viable, it must be capa-
ble of adapting to the changing needs of the citizenry. The people of
Iran have seen three constitutions this century, none of which has
provided them with the reforms that they had been promised. As re-
cent events in Iran indicate, the people are beginning to seriously
question their constitution and the system of government it embod-
ies.25
2 See id.
25 See id.
252 See id.
2 Fairbanks, supra note 232, at 52.
See i& at 52-53 (observing that Khatami will succeed in getting the cultural and political
restrictions imposed upon the people relaxed and that Khatami will be able to pursue a more
open and engaging foreign policy).
255 See, e.g., Jehl, Iranian Clerics Hint at Treason Trial for Critic, supra note 247, at A8. In an in-
terview, Ayatollah Shirazi, "one of Iran's most respected clerics" stated that "[t]here are people
who believe Iran should turn into a secular establishment, like the Turkish system." Id.
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